Housing policy, mortgage markets, and housing outcomes in Korea by Kim, Kyung-Hwan & Cho, Man
KorKorea’s Economy
Korea’s Economy
2010
Volume 26
a publication of 
the Korea Economic 
Institute and the
Korea Institute for 
International
Economic Policy
Korea’s Economy
Korea’s Economic Prospects and Challenges
Korea’s Economic Stability and Resilience in Time of Crisis
The Republic of Korea and the North Pacic Economy: After the Great Panic of 2008
Housing Policy, Mortgage Markets, and Housing Outcomes in Korea
Financial Crises and East Asia’s Financial Cooperation
U.S.-Korea Economic Relations: A (Historical) View From Seoul
U.S.-Korea Economic Relations: A Washington Perspective
The Rocky Road for Modernizing the North Korean Economy
How Available are DPRK Statistics?
CONTENTS
Part I: Overview and Macroeconomic 
Issues
Korea’s Economic Prospects and Challenges
Subir Lall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
Korea’s Economic Stability and Resilience in 
Time of Crisis
Lee Jun-kyu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Republic of Korea and the North Pacific 
Economy: After the Great Panic of 2008
Jeffrey Shafer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 Part II: Financial Institutions and Markets
Housing Policy, Mortgage Markets, and Housing 
Outcomes in Korea
Kim Kyung-hwan and Cho Man  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Financial Crises and East Asia’s Financial Coop-
eration
Park Young-joon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Part III: External Issues
U.S.-Korea Economic Relations: 
      A (Historical) View from Seoul
      Kim Wonky ng . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     
      A Washington Perspective
      Deena Magnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Part V: North Korea’s Economic 
Development and External Relations
The Rocky Road for Modernizing the North Ko-
rean Economy
Bradley Babson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
How Available are DPRK Statistics? 
Lee Suk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
24144_000ix_TOC-R1.indd   1 7/12/2010   11:20:54 AM
o
I
24144_034_Blank1.indd   34 6/21/2010   12:22:58 PM
                                                               FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS                19
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS
HOUSING POLICY, MORTGAGE MARKETS, AND HOUSING OUTCOMES IN 
KOREA
By Kim Kyung-Hwan and Cho Man
The Korean housing sector as of the early 1990s was 
characterized as an example of financial repression 
combined with rigid urban land use regulations.1 Since 
then, the sector has gone through a major structural 
change in the wake of the Asian currency crisis of 
1997. Among the most significant shifts, the mortgage 
finance system was liberalized in the late 1990s as a 
part of financial liberalization that included interest 
rate deregulation. As commercial banks were al-
lowed to make mortgage loans, competition among 
lenders intensified. This has led to a rapid expansion 
of mortgage lending and the introduction of various 
mortgage products. Furthermore, developers emerged 
as key players in the residential construction market, 
relying on project financing for land acquisition and 
other early-stage expenses.
Although the housing finance system went through 
such major changes, no fundamental changes were 
brought to the housing supply system that would 
have made it more responsive to market signals. As 
the economy recovered from the 1997 crisis, housing 
prices bounced back starting in 2000 and developed 
into a housing price boom from 2002 until 2007. The 
housing boom, which was modest compared with 
what happened in many advanced economies, can 
be explained by a combination of a surge in housing 
demand prompted by low interest rates and an expan-
sion of mortgage lending on the one hand, and sluggish 
supply on the other hand.
The latest house price hike was most marked in Seoul, 
especially in its submarkets southeast of the Han 
River, the most popular residential areas but where 
the supply of housing is very inelastic. The rapid 
house price appreciation was countered by various 
policy interventions aimed at stabilizing housing 
prices by suppressing demand through taxation and 
other counter-speculative measures regulating new 
supply and redevelopment in Seoul. As a result, new 
housing supply in Seoul and in the Seoul capital region 
(SCR) has fallen substantially since 2003, with the 
exception of 2007. The housing price boom ended in 
2007, and then the shock wave of the U.S. subprime 
mortgage debacle spilled out to other parts of the world 
in 2008. The Korean economy took a downturn, and 
housing prices started falling around July 2008. The 
drop in house prices was much smaller than had been 
feared, however, and it lasted only eight months before 
turning around. By fall 2009, the Korean government 
reintroduced measures to contain demand for fear of 
another house price run-up.
This paper aims to trace the major changes that took 
place in the Korean housing market and the housing 
finance system during the past decade, and also to 
offer an evaluation of government interventions on 
housing outcomes. We focus our attention on the role 
of the expansion of mortgage lending on the housing 
market as it interacted with inelastic supply responses 
to demand shocks. The paper draws lessons and policy 
implications from the Korean experience.
The rest of this paper consists of the following sec-
tions: evolution and current state of housing policy 
and housing outcomes in Korea (the next section), 
developments in mortgage markets and policy issues, 
and lessons for other countries along with concluding 
remarks (the final section).
1. Bertrand Renaud, “Compounding Financial Repression with Rigid Urban Regulations: Lessons of the Korean Housing Market,” 
Review of Urban and Regional Studies 1, no. 1 (1989): 1–22; Richard K. Green, Stephen Malpezzi, and Kerry Vandell, “ Urban 
Regulations and the Price of Land and Housing in Korea,” Journal of Housing Economics 3, no. 4 (1993): 330–56.
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Evolution and the Current State of Housing 
Policy and Housing Outcomes
Brief Review of Housing Policy
Throughout the periods of rapid economic growth 
and urbanization, the Korean government has been 
heavily involved in the housing sector. Government 
interventions pursued two main policy goals: solving 
the problem of chronic shortages of housing, especially 
in Seoul and other large cities; and stabilizing hous-
ing prices by increasing supplies while suppressing 
speculation.
The 1989–92 drive to build two million new dwelling 
units was a major milestone as it led to a 30 percent 
increase in housing stock between 1988 and 1992. 
Thanks to the massive increases in new supply, hous-
ing prices did start declining in 1991 and remained 
stable throughout the mid-1990s. Although this 
ambitious government campaign helped resolve the 
housing shortage within a short time period, it also 
showed that housing supply was a political parameter 
under government control rather than a response of 
housing producers and the factor markets to changes 
in demand conditions.
As the housing shortage was perceived to be under 
control, government instituted a number of policy 
changes in the mid-1990s: lifting price controls on new 
apartments in phases starting in 1995; deregulating 
the housing finance market by inviting new mortgage 
lenders while privatizing the Korea Housing Bank, 
the government-owned monopolistic housing finance 
institution, in 1997; and relaxing regulations on the 
conversion of agricultural land near the outer edge of 
built-up urban areas in 1994. Nevertheless, the supply-
side reform was fragmented and piecemeal.
The Asian currency crisis that broke out in late 1997 
caused a near collapse of housing prices in 1998. As 
interest rates ramped up rapidly, the costs of borrowing 
rose quickly, resulting in large numbers of bankrupt-
cies of debt-ridden construction companies. Facing 
this unprecedented crisis, the Korean government 
tried to boost the housing sector to facilitate a speedy 
recovery. Many regulations that for years had been 
taken for granted were suddenly modified or removed 
altogether: the partial relaxation of regulations preserv-
ing greenbelts and the abolition of the price controls 
on new apartments being examples. Unlike the recent 
financial crisis in the United States, however, the real 
estate sector in Korea was a victim, rather than a cause, 
of the crisis in the 1990s, and the real estate sector was 
in fact used as a catalyst of a speedy recovery.2
One important feature of Korean housing policy 
was its heavy bias toward owner-occupied housing. 
On the rental side, the public rental housing stock is 
very small. Chonsei accounted for 21 percent of all 
households in Korea and 32 percent in Seoul as of 
2005; chonsei is a unique private rental arrangement 
in which the tenant pays a large up-front deposit that is 
fully refunded at the end of the lease.3 During the lease 
period, the tenant does not pay monthly rent.4 Except 
for the program of supplying some 200,000 rental 
dwellings to the lowest income group as a component 
of the drive to build two million units, there was in 
the past no systematic policy effort to promote rental 
housing. This changed dramatically during the Roh 
Moo-hyun government, which introduced a 10-year 
plan to build one million rental housing units. The 
Lee Myung-bak government modified the program 
by reducing the rental housing portion and increasing 
affordable homes for owner occupation.
Finally, the lack of transparency in the housing mar-
ket has been a problem. The Roh government made 
an important contribution to improving the situation 
by establishing a system that mandated that actual 
transaction prices be reported and recorded in title 
documents.
2. See Kyung-Hwan Kim, “Could a Real Estate Bubble Cause an Economic Crisis in Korea?” in Asia’s Financial Crisis and the 
Role of Real Estate, ed. K. Mera and B. Renaud (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000) for a discussion of the behavior of housing 
markets and government responses during the Asian crisis.
3. The ratio between the chonsei deposit and the asset price varies across housing types and locations. In the case of condominiums, 
the current figure is 54 percent for the nation and 40 percent in Seoul.
4. See Brent W. Ambrose and Sunwoong Kim, “Modeling the Korean Chonsei Lease Contract,” Real Estate Economics  31, 
no. 1 (2003): 53–74.
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Trends in Housing Quantity and Quality
There have been dramatic improvements in both the 
quantity and the quality of housing during the past two 
decades. To illustrate, the housing supply ratio—the 
ratio between the number of housing units and the 
number of households—increased countrywide from 
72 percent (58 percent in Seoul) in 1990 to 109.9 
percent (93.8 percent in Seoul) in 2008. Per capita con-
sumption of housing space jumped from 13.8 square 
meters to 22.8 square meters between 1990 and 2005. 
In 1990, only 34 percent of housing units in Korea 
had a shower or bathroom facility, and 51 percent 
of total units had a water-borne toilet (94 percent in 
Seoul had such facilities); both indicators increased to 
percentages in the mid-90s by 2005. Such a remarkable 
achievement is attributable to the massive increases 
in the supply of modern apartments.
The level of new housing construction exceeded a half 
million units a year until it dwindled in the aftermath of 
the 1997 Asian currency crisis. Housing construction 
recovered its precrisis level by 2001, but then signifi-
cantly dropped in 2004 and has remained low since 
then. The shortfall in new supply has been marked in 
Seoul and in the SCR. The trend in new housing supply 
reflects the impact of government policy to stabilize 
housing prices during the latest price run-up.
There no longer exists an overall housing shortage in 
Korea, as the number of houses exceeds that of house-
holds in the country as a whole. Instead, the problem 
is the mismatch between demand and supply in local 
markets. The combination of a reasonably steady flow 
of new construction and a continuous decline in the 
supply of new housing in Seoul and the SCR has led to 
a sporadic price hike in the submarkets with inadequate 
supply and to a large glut of unsold houses in locations 
with insufficient demand (see Table 1).
House Price Trends and Government Responses
The inflation-adjusted rate of change in housing prices 
and chonsei deposits during the past two decades is 
illustrated by Figure 1. After the precipitous fall in 
1998, housing prices bounced back starting in 1999 
and began to rise significantly in late 2001, helped 
by the record-low interest rate and rapid expansion 
of consumer credit. Nonetheless, the rate of house 
price appreciation at the national level was moderate 
Table 1: Trends in New Construction and Unsold Houses in Korea, 1995–2009 
 
Location 
New housing construction (by year) 
1995–98 
1999–
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Korea 528,414 508,650 585,382 463,800 463,641 469,503 555,792 371,285 381,787 
Seoul 76,965 108,688 115,755 58,122 51,797 39,694 62,842 48,417 36,090 
Incheon 23,157 34,820 29,392 22,440 17,588 15,876 41,571 33,632 59,519 
Gyeonggi 129,398 146,263 152,142 125,157 128,516 116,488 198,138 115,531 159,549 
SCR1 229,519 289,771 297,289 205,719 197,901 172,058 302,551 197,580 255,158 
 Stock of unsold houses (year end) 
Korea 113,380 46,464 38,261 69,133 57,215 73,772 112,254 165,599 123,297 
Seoul 1,927 1,914 735 612 574 529 454 2,486 1,803 
Incheon 4,197 957 467 1,770 1,196 426 527 1,647 4,539 
Gyeonggi 18,511 10,002 6,168 13,076 10,472 3,769 13,643 22,795 19,325 
SCR1 24,635 12,873 7,370 15,458 12,242 4,724 14,624 26,928 25,667 
 
Source: Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, Seoul. 
1 SCR = Seoul capital region (Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi Province). 1
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compared with that of many advanced economies.5 The 
price hike was geographically concentrated in Seoul, 
especially in the condominiums located in the three 
districts in southeast Seoul (known as the Gangnam 
area; see Figure 2). The steady rise in employment 
and population in that area, which is well known for 
the quality of its public schools and amenities, and the 
very sluggish increase in housing stock over the years 
are believed to be the underlying causes of the rapid 
run-up in house prices there.
hensive real estate tax on expensive condominiums 
was introduced in 2005, and the capital gains tax was 
raised, in particular, for owners of two or more houses. 
The government also introduced various regulations 
covering housing development, including a series of 
new restrictions on redevelopment as well as reinstitu-
tion of the price controls on new apartments that had 
been lifted in 1999.
In addition , the government set a limit on the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio and debt-to-income (DTI) ratio 
to discourage home purchases via leverage in those 
hot markets. A limit on LTV was first introduced in 
September 2002; it was set at 60 percent for mortgages 
on houses located in Seoul, Incheon, and selected cities 
in Gyeonggi Province, and it was then expanded to 
the whole country in October 2002. It was lowered to 
40 percent in July 2005 for condominiums located in 
hot markets and valued at 600 million won and above. 
The current Lee Myung-bak government returned 
the LTV limit to 60 percent in November 2008, but 
later lowered it to 50 percent beginning in September 
2009. A DTI limit of 40 percent was first introduced 
in August 2005 for speculative transactions, and 
then the limitation was extended to condominiums 
located in hot markets and valued at 600 million 
won and above. The DTI limit was lifted in 2008 
but reinstituted in September 2009 at 50–60 percent 
to apply to mortgages exceeding 50 million won on 
condominiums located in the Seoul capital region. The 
LTV and DTI regulations are considered one of the 
most effective measures for cooling off demand and 
the resulting hike in house prices.
The housing price boom ended in 2007, and then the 
shock wave of the U.S. subprime mortgage debacle 
turned into a financial crisis and spilled over to other 
parts of the world in 2008. Consequently, the Korean 
economy took a downturn, and housing prices started 
falling in about July 2008. The drop in house prices 
was much smaller than initially feared, however, and it 
lasted for only eight months before turning around. In 
fact, the government reintroduced measures to contain 
demand for fear of another house price run-up by the 
fall of 2009.
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Figure 1: Real Rates of Change in Housing 
Prices and Chonsei Deposits in Korea and in 
Seoul, 1987–2009
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Source: Authors’ computations with the use of 
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5. Bertrand Renaud and Kyung-Hwan Kim, “Global House Price Boom and Its Aftermath,” Housing Finance International 22 
(December 2007): 3–15.
Despite the localized nature of the house price run-up, 
the government went back to its arsenal of traditional 
weapons to suppress speculators. The efforts to stabi-
lize house prices were strengthened further as the then 
new government headed by the late president, Roh 
Moo-hyun, took office in early 2003. The government 
waged an all-out campaign to contain rising house 
prices with a barrage of policy packages. Between 
2003 and 2007 about three dozen policy packages 
were introduced, extending to taxation, regulations, 
and mortgage financing. For example, the compre-
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Housing Finance System and Policy 
Challenges
Changes in the Housing Finance System
The Asian financial crisis brought a sea change to the 
real estate finance system in Korea. First and foremost, 
residential mortgage lending was liberalized, resulting 
in a sharp increase in lending volume. As shown 
in Table 2, the ratio of mortgage debt outstanding 
to gross domestic product increased from about 10 
percent before the crisis to 36 percent,6 a level similar 
to levels in Japan and France. Also the secondary 
mortgage market was introduced in 1999, and it paved 
the way for wholesale funding through the issuance 
of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Furthermore, 
the housing finance system has been transformed 
from one dominated by narrowly based special-circuit 
institutions to a market-based system, with the share 
of commercial banks and other private-sector lenders 
exceeding 90 percent in recent years.
A dominant share of mortgage loans in Korea makes 
use of variable interest rates that are pegged to short-
term market rates, such as the three-month certificate 
of deposit rate. After early 2006, both the benchmark 
and lending rates rose steadily until September 2008. 
Since then, however, the rates have declined owing 
to the accommodative monetary policy to combat the 
slowdown of the real economy caused by the global 
financial crisis. The spread over the benchmark rate 
rose from 1.39 percent in August 2008 to 2.98 percent 
in March 2009 owing to rising risk averseness in the 
overall financial system in Korea in the wake of the 
turmoil in the global financial markets after the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers. But the spread has been 
narrowing since then.
The maximum LTV ratio, one key underwriting crite-
rion, is capped at 60 percent for private-sector lending; 
it is capped at 70 percent for public-sector lending. 
The DTI ratios were added as another key underwrit-
ing condition in 2007, and they are currently set at 
33 percent for the front-end ratio (in other words, the 
mortgage payment over income) and at 40 percent for 
the back-end ratio (the total debt service over income). 
In most cases, there is a penalty for early repayment 
of principal within five years from origination. The 
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Figure 2: Real Prices for Condominiums in Seoul and Gangnam, 1988–2008
Source: Neonet.
Note: 2005 prices; price is per pyong (1 pyong = 3.3 square meters).
Won, 10,000
6. This figure may underestimate the size of the housing loans because it does not include unofficial housing loans extended to the 
landlord by the tenant in the form of a chonsei deposit. The total size of this unofficial housing finance system is estimated to be 
about one-half of the total mortgage debt outstanding in Korea; see Man Cho and Kyung-Hwan Kim, “Three Pillars of Mortgage 
Credit Risk Management: A Conceptual Framework and the Korean Case,” Housing Finance International, December 2009.
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delinquency rate (payments that are more than 30 
days behind) remains reasonably low to date, after a 
temporary surge in late 2008.
ger of deleveraging in the household sector.7 Micro 
analyses show, however, that the explosive increase 
in consumer lending in Korea during the past decade 
was concentrated in high-income households and that 
those high-income consumers used the borrowed funds 
predominantly for acquiring real estate.8 Also, the LTV 
ratio of outstanding mortgages is about 47 percent, and 
the delinquency rate is stable (Table 3). However, as 
the interest rate is likely to be raised as part of an exit 
strategy, this could possibly lead to a deterioration of 
borrowers’ debt service capacity for mortgage and 
other consumer debt, especially for borrowers prone 
to income and employment shocks.
This will require careful monitoring. The government 
might further tighten the LTV and DTI regulations if 
the volume of mortgages continues to expand and the 
household credit risk increases.
Key risk parameters to watch in the mortgage lending 
sector include loan maturity, interest rate variability, 
and principal repayment schedule. Although a 15-
year fixed-rate mortgage was the dominant product 
before the 1997 Asian currency crisis, variable-
interest-rate mortgages with short maturities, usually 
three years, have become dominant since, imposing 
a high credit risk at the time of rollover of existing 
loans. The short-term bullet mortgages with initial 
interest-only payment periods carry the risk of loan 
rejection or of a higher risk premium, depending on 
market and borrower-specific conditions at the time 
of refinancing. Fortunately, because of inducements 
by the government, the average maturity of new mort-
gages has lengthened in recent years. The share of 
mortgage loans with principal amortization, rather than 
interest-only payments, has also increased (Table 4). 
Although the maturity has been extended, the existing 
stock of those short-term rollover loans would still be 
a systemic risk factor to watch going forward.
A more fundamental issue is that more than 90 
percent of mortgage loans outstanding in Korea are 
still adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), making the 
7. “Debt and Deleveraging: The Global Credit Bubble and Its Economic Consequences,” McKinsey Global Institute, January 
2010.
8.See Joon-Kyung Kim, “Recent Changes in Korean Households’ Indebtedness and Debt Service Capacity,” KDI School Working 
paper no. 08-23 (Seoul: KDI School of Public Policy and Management, December 2008). Kim also pointed out that this skewed 
borrowing contributed to worsening the distribution of wealth in Korea. 
Table 2: Growth of Mortgage Debt Outstanding as a  
Percentage of  Gross Domestic Product, 1994, 2000,  
and 2006 
 
Countries 1994 2000 2006 
Netherlands 46.4 74.2 111.9 
Denmark 64.9 76.1 100.8 
United Kingdom 54.6 56.3 83.1 
Australia 33.2 55.5 82.2 
United States 46.4 52.1 77.2 
Ireland 22.8 31.6 70.1 
Portugal 15.6 43.9 59.2 
Spain 15.8 30.9 58.6 
Sweden 54.8 45.7 56.7 
Germany 44.1 54.1 51.3 
Finland 36.2 30.7 43.8 
Japan 34.4 36.6 36.1 
Korea 11.0 13.0 35.7 
France 20.8 21.5 32.2 
Italy 6.0 10.0 18.7 
 
Source: Kyung-Hwan Kim and Bertrand Renaud,  
“Global House Price Boom and Its Unwinding:  
An Analysis and a Commentary,” Housing Studies 24, 
no. 1 (2009): 7–24. 
Policy Issues
Household debt, including home mortgages, has 
increased substantially in Korea during the past 10 
years. Household debt jumped from 192 trillion won 
to 692 trillion won between 1999 and 2009, or from 
35 percent to 65 percent of GDP. This rapid growth 
in household debt gives a reason for concern. McK-
insey Global Institute pointed out the potential dan-
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sector vulnerable in an environment of rising inter-
est rates. Although both public- and private-sector 
institutions have been trying to promote fixed-rate 
mortgages (FRM) with long maturities, the FRM’s 
market share remains very small. The well-known 
“tilt,” or front-load, problem in FRM—that is, high 
initial monthly payments—and other factors such as 
the high price-to-income ratios operate as impediments 
to expanding FRM products in Korea. To deal with this 
policy challenge, hybrid mortgages with a reasonable 
cap structure (for example, a “5/1/1/ ARM” with a 5 
percent lifetime cap and 1 percent maximum for the 
first and subsequent adjustments) as well as various 
affordability-enhancing mortgage products such as 
equity-sharing mortgages, variable-maturity mortgage, 
price-level-adjusted mortgages can be further explored 
by market participants.
Related to the above, the expansion of the mobilization 
of funds for mortgages from capital markets is 
another challenge. Currently, mortgage funding in 
Korea is almost all based on bank deposits, which 
is a key reason for the dominance of ARM products 
in mortgage markets. In addition to the welfare 
implication of the interest rate risk that ARM 
borrowers are exposed to, deposit-based funding 
can be unstable depending on the landscape for the 
market for small saving. Similar to what happened 
to lenders in the U.S. savings-and-loan crisis in the 
1980s, large lenders in Korea have recently been facing 
stiff competition from money market funds and other 
short-term investment vehicles. Therefore, securing a 
more stable and longer-term funding source would be 
important. In addition to MBSs issued by the Korea 
Housing Finance Corporation and large commercial 
banks, covered bonds (CBs) are being discussed as an 
alternative wholesale funding instrument. A careful 
study comparing CBs with MBSs in the Korean 
context would be warranted.
Next, collection and sharing of data on consumer credit 
will be critical for further advancing risk-based mort-
gage underwriting and capital management. Currently, 
data sharing is confined to small numbers of partici-
Table 3: Delinquency Rate on Consumer Loans and Mortgages in Korea, All Banks, 2004–09, 
percentage 
 
Type of 
loan 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2008 2009 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Consumer 
loans 
1.7 1.1 0.7 0.55 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.60 0.8 0.59 0.54 0.42 
Mortgages 1.8 1.1 0.6 0.43 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.47 0.6 0.43 0.41 0.33 
 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Seoul. 
Table 4: Share of Mortgages with Long Maturity and Principal Amortization, 2004–09, trillions of 
won 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Maturity 
longer than 10 
years 
New annual 
issuance 
50.7 57.4 71.1 71.3 61.3 N.A. 
Principal 
amortization 
 53.8 63.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Maturity 
longer than 10 
years 
Year-end 
outstanding 
balance 
20.7 34.4 51.0 58.0 59.6 55.7 
Principal 
amortization 
 23.2 36.3 52.4 59.2 60.9 56.9 
 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Seoul. 
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pating institutions within the banking sector, whether 
they are commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative 
banks, or capital companies. A broader sharing of data 
in developing credit or mortgage scores will enhance 
the soundness in risk management and will reduce 
systemic risks in case of an economic shock.
As the mortgage lending sector develops, serving the 
underserved better becomes a key policy issue. Efforts 
should be made to extend financial services to those 
with insufficient wealth, income, or credit standing 
while the practice of more mature risk management 
and risk sharing is secured. Related to this point, devel-
opment of a well-functioning mortgage insurance (MI) 
industry is an important next step in mortgage market 
development in Korea. Currently, LTV thresholds are 
very much constraining the demand for mortgages 
from potential borrowers. As shown in Table 5, 85 per-
cent of borrowers are concentrated near the LTV limit 
(in the 50–70 percent range). In this circumstance, 
an expanded MI program, offered either by public or 
private insurers, would be an effective instrument in 
enabling the mortgage finance industry to better serve 
wealth-constrained households.
It is also imperative to develop mortgage products that 
cater to the preferences and repayment capabilities 
of the currently underserved clientele. To this end, 
analyses on mortgage choice and demand patterns, on 
efficient and stable funding methods, and on manag-
ing embedded risks will all be needed.9 Furthermore, 
a framework for sound banking supervision will also 
be required. A dynamic capital provisioning, tools 
for managing systemic risk, and other ongoing policy 
reforms being discussed in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis should be considered.
Concluding Remarks
During the past two decades, housing standards have 
improved remarkably in terms of both quantity and 
price. This achievement was made in an environment 
subjected to extensive government interventions in the 
housing market. In fact, Korea has various regulations 
and other distortive measures that cannot be found 
elsewhere, which are likely to have limited the scope 
of further improvement in the housing sector.
This paper provided an overview of the evolution of 
housing policy and housing outcomes during the past 
decade, focusing on the developments in the housing 
finance system. A major conclusion is that significant 
progress has been made on mortgage financing since 
the 1997 Asian crisis but that no fundamental changes 
have been brought to the housing supply system. This 
poses a serious issue, as the combination of inelastic 
supply and demand increases will lead to a highly 
volatile housing price path.10 In light of the uncertainty 
about future housing demand expected to emanate 
from changes in preferences following income growth, 
aging of population, and slowdown of population 
growth, a more flexible housing supply system that is 
responsive to changing demand conditions is called 
for. There is much room for policy reform.
Another policy implication to draw from the Korean 
experience is the rental housing policy, or lack thereof, 
until recent years. Historically, the rental sector in 
9. See Man Cho, “Managing Mortgage Credit Risk: What Went Wrong with the Subprime and Alt-A Markets?” International Real 
Estate Review 12, no. 3 (2009): 295–324.
10. See Kyung-Hwan Kim and Man Cho, “Structural Changes, House Price Dynamics and Housing Affordability in Korea,” working 
paper, July 2009, for a graphical analysis of this possibility.
Table 5: Percentages of Borrowers Falling under Various Loan-to-Value Ratio Thresholds, 2008 
 
Areas <10% 10–20% 20–30% 30–40% 40–50% 50–60% 60–70% 
Korea 0.3 0.6 1.6 3.1 5.9 35.6 53.0 
Seoul 0.3 1.0 2.3 4.3 7.2 41.4 43.4 
 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation, Seoul. 
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Korea was dominated by the chonsei system, and 
government policy was skewed to the provision 
of owner-occupied housing. But the private rental 
sector has not been fully developed. The tax system 
penalizing the ownership of more than one house 
has been a constraint in attracting private capital 
into the small-scale rental business. Promoting home 
ownership is politically popular, but unsustainable 
homeownership could create a social problem, as 
was demonstrated by the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis.11
Finally, it is important to maintain a sound and safe 
mortgage lending system as the financing sector is de-
veloped and expanded over time. To that end, the argu-
ment by Gramlich is relevant and worth considering,12 
in addition to the risk management tools discussed 
earlier. The implication is a proper targeting of the 
high-risk lending sector and a periodic monitoring 
thereof will help prevent a systemic shock either from 
the real sector or from the financial sector.
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